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WHAT IS LIVING A N D WHAT IS D E A D IN E U R O C E N T R I S M :
A REVIEW-ESSAY OF J.M. BLAUT'S EIGHT E U R O C E N T R I C
HISTORIANS.
RICARDO DUCHESNE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW BRUNSWICK, CANADA

Historians and sociologists have long been fascinated by the "rise
of the West." For a long time the consensus was that Europe was a
unique civilization which began to diverge from the rest of the world as
early as ancient Greece, if not later, during Medieval and Renaissance
times. In the last decade, however, a determined army of scholars, led
by James Blaut (1993), Jack Goody (1996), Bing Wong (1997), Andre
Gunder Frank (1998), Ken Pomeranz (2000), and Jack Goldstone
(2000) has mounted a frontal attack on this consensus. Although these
scholars offer different answers to the question why modern industry
arose first in Europe, they all insist that, as late as 1750/1800, there were
few substantial economic and technological differences between
Europe and Asia.
Blaut's Eight Eurocentric Historians, the second volume of a
planned trilogy under the title The Colonizer's Model of the World, is a
continuation of this challenge. Unfortunately, shortly after completing
this book, Blaut passed away, and the third volume, which was to contain his own explanation of the rise of Europe, will not be forthcoming.
We do have a sketch of this "non-Eurocentric" theory in the first volume, released in 1993 with the same title as the three- volume project,
though with the additional subtitle:"Geographical Diffusionism and
Eurocentric History."
Volume II also has a brief summary of the logic of this theory [812]. It asserts that, in 1500, the levels and rates of development of the
civilizations of the world were similar [10-11] to Europe. Europe
moved slowly ahead only after it began to reap great profits from the
Americas. But this undeveloped theory, which thus far holds no new
surprises, but follows the well-known argument that the colonization of
the New World was decisive to Europe's industrialization, should not be
viewed as the main theme or even goal of this project.
Blaut certainly seems unconcerned with empirically based arguments showing, for instance, that the profits of the colonial trade
between Europe and the Americas were too small to have contributed
much to capital formation in the period of the industrial revolution, or
that the slave trade and the plantation sector in general, which Blaut
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sees as crucial, were no more uniquely important to the industrialization
process than were many other important home industries in 18th century Britain.
The legacy of this project, I would say, lies somewhere else: making us aware that at the root of many (Blaut would insist all) accounts
of the "European miracle" and the "rise of the west" is the taken-forgranted belief that Europe has always been more progressive and more
enlightened than the East. While the first volume exposed in general the
origins of Eurocentrism as a colonialist ideology guided by a specific
set of racial, cultural and environmental assumptions about the superiority of Western civilization, Eight Eurocentric Historians, the second
volume, is a close textual analysis of the work of eight prominent proponents of this superiority, namely: Lynn White (1962), Robert Brenner
(1976), E.L. Jones (1981), Michael Mann (1986), John Hall (1985),
Jared Diamond (1997), and David Landes (1998), including a short initial chapter on Max Weber as the most influential classical thinker on
each of these scholars.
But the virtue of this work - its direct, bold style in tracking down
the unexamined assumptions of Eurocentric exponents - is also its
weakness. This book is unsatisfied with revealing the shortfalls of past
arguments. It wants, ultimately, to imprint on us the message that any
explanation that looks within Europe, particularly pre-1500 Europe, for
something that made it rise to hegemony is intrinsically Eurocentric,
and therefore wrong.
Blaut correctly points out that contemporary scholars no longer
subscribe to the idea that Europe's rise lay in the racial superiority of
white people over the people of other races. He also argues well that
many (he would say most) contemporary scholars look to the environment and culture to explain why Europe grew richer, and that these
explanations are Eurocentric because they do claim - in a language at
times insensitive to other places and cultures - that the environment and
culture of Europe were inherently superior.
Blaut, however, wants to do more than just show that a colonialist
ideology is at the roots of these arguments: he wants to convince us as
well that Eurocentrism is "factually" wrong. What if some of these arguments, or parts of them, are shown to withstand the empirical tests performed by its critics? Do we still reject them as Eurocentric? Is it possible at all to prioritize factors that make Europe distinct without being
Eurocentric?
I think Blaut was right, as he tells in the Preface, to take the advice
3
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of a friend who suggested that, if he is to convince the scholarly community that their "most cherished beliefs" are wrong, he has "to take on
the historians themselves, the influential expounders of Eurocentric
world history, and answer their specific arguments" [xii]. Too many
scholars today are satisfied with detecting two or three weak points in
an argument before they jump into developing their "new theory," without really tackling the logic, the methodologies, the sources, and the
architectural nuances of the existing theories.
Historiographical mapping of a debate of this magnitude is an
excellent way of taking stock of what has been achieved and what needs
to be done. Blaut is quite effective in dissecting and refuting some of the
claims and assumptions these authors make to explain the historical priority of Europe. I question, however, whether the eight scholars he has
chosen are representative. They may be the "most widely" read and may
"provide almost the entire spectrum of Eurocentric arguments that are
being widely used today" [16]. Yet, as Blaut recognizes, these historians
(with the possible exception of Diamond) offer very similar arguments
varying only in the emphasis they place on certain factors and the use
of evidence, each influenced by Weber's (apparent) belief in the "rationality" of Europeans and the "irrationality and traditionalism" of nonEuropeans.
Moreover, since Blaut analyzes sequentially the writings of these
scholars, each in separate chapters, the result is excessive duplication.
This problem is compounded, as the book moves on, by Blaut's growing sense of complacency and sweeping rejection of too many (already
criticized) "Eurocentric" arguments as "not true," "not so," "absolutely
untrue," "this is of course nonsense," and so on. This repetition could
have been easily avoided by grouping into one chapter two or three of
the scholars with the most common arguments, and allowing space for
less similar theories and books.
Readers are indeed left wondering why two of the most impressive
world history books are missing: William McNeill's The Rise of the
West, A History of the Human Community (1963), and Fernand
Braudel's three volume work, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th
Century (1981, 1982, 1984). Or why more recent specialized contributions such as Toby Huffs The Rise of Early Modern Science: Islam,
China, and the West (1995), Alfred Crosby's The Measure of Reality,
Quantification and Western Society, 1250-1600 (1999), and Margaret
Jacob's Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West (1997),
are not even mentioned. Exploring them would have added some excitPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2002
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ing variety to Blaut's uniform overview and quick dismissals of the
same points.
One wonders whether these books were ignored because they could
not be fitted into a "model" that defines Eurocentric scholars as inherently limited and prejudicial in their knowledge of the East. Although
McNeill and Braudel both insist that 16th century Europe had certain
legal, military, and intellectual features that set it apart from other civilizations, they do so in full appreciation of the intercivilizational character of world cultures, without characterizing the East as "static" or
"backward." The very thesis of Rise of the West is that civilizations are
not independent entities but have fundamental interrelations throughout
their history. But this does not mean that all cultures have the same rates
of economic and technical development. McNeill thinks Europe rose to
world dominance during the 16th century because it "possessed three
talismans of power" lacking elsewhere: "(1) a deep-rooted pugnacity
and recklessness operating by means of (2) a complex military technology, most notably in naval matters; (3) a population inured to a variety
of diseases which had long been endemic throughout the Old World
ecumene" [McNeill: 569].
I imagine Blaut would have been rather pleased with an argument
that explains (and blames) Europe's rise in terms of the germs its inhabitants carried to the New World. It is a view which conforms with his
"uniformitarian" argument that, in 1500, many areas of Afro-Eurasia
had more or less the same potential for modernity, and that Europe's
colonial empire was a fortunate result of the relatively milder Atlantic
wind systems as compared to the Pacific.
Actually Blaut does cite approvingly Crosby's earlier book, The
Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492
(1972). Yet, welcoming as he is to this early Crosby, he willfully ignores
the later Crosby who wrote, in Measure of Reality:"as I played out my
role as a biological determinist, I was nagged by the impression that
Europeans were incomparably successful at sending ships across oceans
to predetermined destinations and at arriving at those destinations with
superior weaponry — with, for instance, cannons superior to those of the
Ottomans and the Chinese; that they were more efficient at operating
joint-stock companies and empires of unprecedented extension and
degree of activity than anyone else..." [x]. Are these questions too
Eurocentric?
Let us, for the sake of argument, agree that every interpretation
which sees modernity as a Western phenomenon, including those cul-
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turally sensitive to the indispensable contributions of non-Europeans,
are Eurocentric. Are they mere ideologies dressed-up as theory with no
scholarly merit and little factual basis? Blaut successfully employs
recent scholarship on world history to question some, I would say, of the
"thirty different reasons" which, by his count, "have been put forward
by our eight Eurocentric historians" [200] - reasons which actually
amount to about six or seven cogent, logically rounded arguments.
Some of these arguments, as to be expected, are also found in altered
form in McNeill and Braudel, and developed in much greater detail in
the specialized works of Huff, Crosby, and Jacob. Blaut effectively
challenges (though there is still ample room for disputation) the following three central arguments.
1. Agricultural Revolution.
Europe alone experienced an agricultural revolution in the Middle
Ages which led to a unique system of "intensive" cultivation, with sustained increases in productivity, based on new technologies and new
methods of cultivation. Michael Mann certainly deserves the strongly
worded criticisms of Blaut, as he accepts without reservations (in his
otherwise impressive The Sources of Social Power: Vol. 1. A History of
Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, published in 1986, when the
literature on Asia's agrarian economy was already plentiful) the
accounts of Lynn White (1962) and E.L. Jones (1981). Mann claims that
Europeans, more than "any previous agrarian people," followed a path
of intense cultivation of their heavier, wetter soils through the systematic diffusion of the heavy iron plough, three-field system, horseshoe,
shoulder harness, and water mill [Mann 1986: 412],
As Blaut correctly points out, the soils of northern Europe were
potentially less fertile than the alluvial soils of many river basins in Asia
[117-118, 140]. Under irrigation, both wheat and rice gave far higher
yields than the rain-fed grains of Europe. Compared with the yields per
seed (as estimated by Slicher van Bath (1963) and cited by Mann) for
medieval and modern England [1200/49 4:1; 1500/1699 7:1;
1750/1850 10.6:1], the yields obtained in traditional China were really outstanding: 20:1, or even 30:1 [Bray 1984: 7-8, 476], China was, in
fact, practicing intense farming thousands of years before Europe. Iron
plowshares, both of iron laid over wood and of solid iron, with sturdy
square frames and different kinds of mould-boards, were available in
China as early as the first or second centuries BC - a technology
brought to, or known in Europe, only in the 18th century. The celebrated shoulder harness of medieval Europe was invented in China by the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2002
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first century BC [Bray 1984, Temple 1986],
Few as these details are, I must say, less are offered by Blaut who,
apart from general remarks of the type "x technology was in use in
much of Asia a millennium earlier," prefers to guide his readers to the
relevant literature. Still, it can be argued, as A. G. Frank has in ReOrient (1998), that Chinese, and possibly Indian, agricultural techniques were ahead of European ones until relatively late, perhaps the
18th century. In terms of preparation of soil and methods of soil preservation, including rotation of crops, selective breeding of seeds, transplanting and winnowing, techniques of water control and local specialization, Chinese farmers were the most gifted [Bray 1984, 1986].
English farmers surpassed them only with the mechanization of farming and the widespread use of artificial fertilizers in the century after
1750 [Overton 1996].
2. Malthus
Blaut also correctly questions (I did not say refutes) the old
Malthusian certainty that Europeans were uniquely rational in practising birth control and ensuring higher living standards, whereas Asians
were irrational practitioners of copulation without restraint and without
regard for resources [85, 182], This old view, succinctly expressed by
Hajnal (1982), and accepted by Eurocentric scholars, may have been
overturned by recent scholarship. If "Christian and especially western
Europe accepted celibacy, late marriage, and more widely spaced
births" (182), as David Landes contends, China, for its part, controlled
fertility by delaying pregnancy within marriage. The result, indeed, was
that birth rates in China may have been "well below those of western
Europe throughout the 1550-1850 period" [Pomeranz 2000: 41],
As Pomeranz also persuasively shows in his carefully researched
book, The Great Divergence, China, Europe, and the Making of the
Modern World Economy (2000), Chinese living standards, were actually comparable to Europe's as late as 1750-1800. China's richest region
- the Yangtzi Delta - was as well-off economically as England and
Holland, and Chinese life expectancies were roughly equal to English
levels or greater than most of Europe. Chinese consumption of luxury
goods, or "non-essentials" such as sugar, tea, tobacco, and furnishings
were higher or similar to those of Europe (see also Wong 1997).
3. Commercial Orientation
Finally, Blaut is on firm ground, supported by abundant sources,
when he says that Asians were as commercially oriented as Europeans,
and traded not just in luxuries but bulk goods [93], and Asian cities were
1
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as commercial and as connected to wide networks of maritime trade as
European cities [67]. Chinese markets for land and labor (and possibly
capital) were just as efficient as Europeans ones, with state-supported
migrations of labor, responsive financial institutions, and alienable
rights in land [Pomeranz 2000]. Until the 1700s, China was able to
maintain a positive balance of trade against the rest of the world including Europe which, apart from the silver stolen from the Americas, had
few competitive manufactured goods to offer [Frank 1998].
These three challenges do call for a substantial reevaluation of the
way Eurocentric scholars have hitherto explained the "European miracle." But there are at least three other major arguments about European
primacy that Blaut thinks have been proven "factually wrong" when the
case could be made instead that recent research have in fact solidified
them.
4. Oriental Despotism.
Of these major arguments, one is known as the "theory of Oriental
Despotism." This theory, which Blaut traces in each of the eight
Eurocentric historians, contrasts between a unified imperial state in the
East that deterred social, scientific, and technological progress, and a
decentralized, relatively pluralistic feudal government in Europe that
protected private property and tolerated the rise of autonomous corporate orders [95-97, 129-132],
Blaut rightfully opposes the notion that Asian markets, merchants,
and proto-industrial organizations were unable to prosper under the
weight of bureaucratic elites, who sought mainly to concentrate wealth
and resources in their own hands at the expense of private competitors.
This theory, however, contains the more significant idea - one fully
misunderstood by Blaut - that European civilization was uniquely composed of "a warren of jurisdictions - kingdoms, dukedoms, baronies,
bishoprics, communes, guilds, universities and more - a compost of
checks and balances [where no] authority, not even the vicar of Christ
on earth, had effective political, religious, or intellectual jurisdiction" to use Crosby's own words [1999: 54].
It was not just a question of Europe's decentralization, since in reality the more centralized societies of Asia experienced long periods of
internal war, state breakdown, and decentralization. What set Europe
apart, rather, was its organization into legally sanctioned institutions
such as cities, universities, and monasteries. Members could enjoy a
degree of autonomy not tolerated, or juridically guaranteed, in more
centralized societies such as China, where authority descended from the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2002
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emperor and his officials down.
There is no denying that from the 8 to the 12 century Europe
learned a great deal from the more advanced Arabic sciences. But thereafter it was Europe that underwent a revolutionary transformation at the
heart of which, as Tony Huff has argued forcefully, was a legal revolution that granted corporate status to the Christian church and a variety
of other collectivities, to make contracts, to enact their own ordinances
and statutes, "to own property, to sue and be sued, and to have legal representation before the king's court" [Huff: 119-138].
Manors, cities, and merchant associations, among others, enacted
whole new systems of law, i.e., manorial law, urban law, and merchant
law. Such legislative, executive, and judicial powers were not a possibility in Islamic societies because in Islamic law there was no separation between the sacred and the secular, no texts and rules to define and
limit the jurisdictional powers of courts, and no idea of corporate groups
independent of the family and kin group [Huff: 138-141, 235]. China,
too, never evolved a conception of law which recognized the right of
corporate bodies, including cities, to regulate their own affairs independently of the state, or the bonds of kinship [Huff: 317],
This legal revolution of the middle ages is intimately connected to
the history of the universities in the West. It is claimed that no other civilization conferred the privileges of a corporation to institutions of higher learning, thus granting these universities a freedom wherein reason
could find a "neutral space" of free inquiry. It was within this unique
institution, Huff contends, together with the independent influence of
Greek thought and its belief in the underlying regularities of nature and
in the rational capacity of humans to comprehend those regularities, as
initially built up and stored by Islamic scholars, that the "external or
social foundations" of modern science were firmly established.
It was here, in the many universities that flourished in Europe in the
12th century, that the ethos of science and its commitment to rational
dialogue based on logic, evidence, and experimentation was nurtured.
Blaut brushes aside any claims about medieval European priority in scientific knowledge with easy remarks such as "scientific thought was
characteristic of all major civilizations. Modern science, in Europe,
emerges well after economic modernization has begun" [145]. True
enough, Arabic and Chinese sciences, in astronomy, mathematics, medicine, and optics, were ahead for many centuries. Yet, once Europeans
translated and elaborated Greek and Arabic texts, they went on to develop a uniquely quantitative conception of the world according to numlh
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ber, weight and measure.
From Roger Bacon (d. 1292) to Jean Buridan (1295-1358), from
Nicolas d'Oresme (1325-82) to Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) - who
wrote: "Think of precision for God is absolute precision itself" [Crosby:
101] - medieval European thinkers anticipated Copernicus, Kepler and
Galileo. These giants celebrated geometry and were convinced that that
numbers were the key to the explanation of nature in terms of matter
and motion. The medieval era thus made a decisive transition to modernity. Impressive as the Chinese were in their ability to create efficient
technologies out of their natural knowledge, or the Arabs in their
sophisticated science of optics, and their complex planetary models (of
the Maraghan school), neither made the big leap to modern science, to
an algebra based on geometric models, to a mechanistic view of the
world with laws that are universal, or to heliocentrism.
5. Rationality
This brings us directly into what Blaut considers to be the theory or
belief underlying every other Eurocentric explanation: Max Weber's
argument that Europeans marched to a higher stage of history because
they have "at all times been more rational than non-Europeans" [20].
Why were Asians stuck with despotic states, high fertility rates, low
standards of living, and backward technologies? Well, or so we are told
Weber says, Asians could not overcome their irrational attachment to
traditional beliefs in magic and superstition, and therefore could not
behave rationally to innovate, invent, and progress. And why were
Europeans able to escape such attachments? They were inherently much
more rational than anyone else. And why?
Blaut cites Weber: "it could be natural to suspect that the most
important reason lay in differences of heredity" though the study of
heredity is still in its infancy and we cannot offer definite answers - a
remark which prompts Blaut to conclude: "Weber saw race as one primordial, or presociological, factor explaining the greatness of
Europeans"[21] If the other seven Eurocentric historians later dropped
this controversial racist card, and retained only the cultural idea that
Europeans were more rational, Weber did not.
A more basic misunderstanding of Weber could hardly be possible.
That certain unfortunate racist passages - three according to Blaut [29]
- can be found in Weber's extensive writings is beyond dispute, and so
can similar remarks be found in Kant, Hegel, Marx, Darwin, and other
great thinkers who grew up when our anthropological knowledge of,
and our personal contact with, non-Europeans was minimal. But these
2
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remarks in Weber are strictly speculative and marginal and are in no
way at the root of his comparative historical sociology.
Blaut also misinterprets Weber's concept of "rationality," as if it
were a rational-choice theory that aimed to explain action by reference
to the costs and benefits to individuals. This is not an understandable
simplification, but a distortion. Within Weber's overarching theme - the
rationalization of the modern world in the context of universal history are recognized three types of rationality: value-rationality, theoretical
rationality, and means-end rationality [Kalberg 1980].
These types of rationality are not limited to the West: they are
found in all cultures. Value rationality refers to orientations guided by a
belief in the intrinsic value of some aesthetic, religious, or ethical idea
independently of its likelihood for success. Theoretical rationality refers
to a type of reasoning which intellectuals employ when they seek to find
(religious, ethical, or scientific) meaning in the chaotic/random events
of everyday life, and to find symmetry, consistency, or purpose in the
world. Means-end rationality involves calculation of alternate means to
a given end. When such calculation is performed in reference to pragmatic self-interests, Weber calls it "practical rationality". When done in
reference to universally applied rules, laws or regulations (that is, when
practical rationality is "rationalized") he calls it "formal rationality."
Now, for Weber, the distinctive character of western rationality lies
in the degree to which rationalization processes based upon means-end
rational action, and rationalization processes based upon theoretical
rationality, have been developed. Among the many areas of social life
where means-end actions were rationalized, he argued, the economy
and the state were critical. While Weber recognized - Blaut's assertions
to the contrary - that some Asian cultures exhibited "a calculative attitude in commercial intercourse," and were highly pragmatic in the pursuit of the best means to attain greater returns, he felt that Europeans
had rationalized those actions to a higher degree. Some of these rationalizations involved the creation of joint liability, the separation of business and personal property, the creation of capital assets in the form of
private ownership of the means of production and of wage labor, and
double-entry bookkeeping [Weber 1981].
In the area of law and administration (or the state), Weber also recognized that China, in particular, had a relatively centralized, largescale bureaucratic administration managed by an official class trained
through formalized examinations. Nonetheless he noted that this administration remained conditioned by personal and kinship relations, and by
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a Confucian ideology that promoted a pious conformism to concrete
familial and political virtues rather than to abstract formalized categories [Love 2000], The West carried this rationalization process further
through the creation of bureaucracies managed primarily by specialized
and trained officials in accordance with impersonal and universal statuses and regulations, and the creation of more integrated and codified
systems of law [Weber 1981].
Weber also observed a "specific and peculiar" western path toward
greater theoretical rationalization in such cultural areas as religion and
science. The rise of universal gods and of ethical salvation religions,
and the rationalization of values advocated by prophets into internally
consistent doctrines by theologians, were early instances of this process
[Schluchter 1985, Kalberg 1994], Calvinism took this process further
by abandoning, for example, the "other-worldly" asceticism of early
Christianity (and Hinduism), and promoting instead a "this-worldly"
religion that celebrated the rational mastery of the world as an ideal.
Weber also appreciated the achievements of Chinese science and technology, particularly in the period before 1500, when it was arguably
superior to European science. But, as the work of Joseph Needham
(1969) later validated, Chinese science remained too empirical in its
orientation and did not formulate a conception of a mathematical and
mechanistic universe operating according to universal rules and regularities.
The above is a simplification, but hopefully not a straw image, of a
historical sociology too rich in ideas, suggestions, and concepts to be
reduced to trivial formulas about western "rationality" and eastern "irrationality." Many as the critiques of Weber have been, the literature supporting and furthering his work is truly impressive. Huffs, Crosby's and
Jacob's books are testimony to this richness, and to the continuing ability of Weberian sociology to cultivate new areas of historical research
and generate different forms of explanation.
Although Crosby's Measure of Reality is not framed in explicit
Weberian terms, it reads indeed like a substantiation of Weber's famous
"Author's Introduction," which is a synopsis of the rationalizations of all
areas of western culture. Crosby detects a profound change during the
late Middle Ages and Renaissance in the mentality of Europe from qualitative to quantitative thinking. He cites a new conception of time as a
succession of quanta, a homogeneous conception of space with no limit,
"no center, up or down;" an algebra using symbols of quantities devoid
of any qualities; a new polyphonic music where sound could be seen as
3

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2002

11

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 47 [2002], No. 47, Art. 4

36

Comparative Civilizations ReviewNo.47

a phenomenon moving through time, written in a paper using a codified
and standardized system of notation for all sounds and rests; in perspective painting, in geometrically precise maps; and in double-entry
bookkeeping.
Jacob, for her part, shows in scholarly detail that what made
England absorb the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century,
and invent a culture of practical science in the eighteenth century, was
due in no small part to a Protestant ethic which worshipped selfimprovement, utility and merit, frugality and saving. This outlook permeated deeply into the general population in England, and dominated
the upbringing and education of prominent 18th century inventors such
as Mathew Boulton and James Watt.
6. Environmental Factors
I also think it is a grave mistake on Blaut's part to dismiss all arguments that look to environmental factors. One can certainly sympathize
with his impatience at half-baked theories that would have Europeans
favored in almost everything: their "warm winds and gentle rain"
[Landes], their "deep and productive clay soils fed by rainfall" [Hall],
their uniquely indented coastline with its peninsulas and its archipelagos favoring seafaring [Mann], These are contrasted with the semi-arid
climes of Asians and their need to use "despotic" forces to irrigate the
land, the higher frequency of natural disasters in Asia and Africa, and
the disease-ridden tropical and sub-tropical regions.
But Blaut is way off the mark when he categorizes Jared
Diamond's book, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human
Societies (1997), as just another, even cruder (culture-less) version of
Eurocentric environmentalism. Diamond's "strict" environmentalist
theory is far more sophisticated and compelling than anything argued
before. It is a theory thoroughly based on new research findings in
genetics, molecular biology, bio-geography, behavioral ecology, epidemiology, linguistics, archaeological studies, and history.
It is a theory which, in its effort to explain the ultimate causes for
the different rates of development of human societies on different continents, looks at the environment in all its complexity and diversity. It
surveys the continental variations in the wild plant and animal species
available as starting materials for domestication, and the axis orientation (east-west and north-south) of the continents, including the size,
location, and geographic barriers within and between continents. It
explores how these factors affected the rate of diffusion and migration
of domesticated crops and animals, the spread of genes for resistence to
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol47/iss47/4
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germs, and of writing and other inventions.
But Blaut misleadingly evaluates this theory as if it consisted of
isolated strands, each comprehensible on its own. Thus, for example,
Diamond's argument that domesticates spread with greater ease and
speed along the east-west axis is turned in Blaut's hands into a simple
claim about the superiority of diffusion in temperate climates "in a belt
stretching across Eurasia from Europe in the west to Japan in the east"
[154]. Having reduced the argument this way, he easily counters "much
of this zone is inhospitable desert and high mountains" [154],
Diamond's argument about the axes makes sense only within the
context of his initial claim that the Fertile Crescent's flora "afforded the
first farmers...an unusually high percentage of wild plants (and animal
species) suitable for domestication." About "32 of the world's 56 prize
wild grasses" were concentrated in the Mediterranean zone of western
Eurasia [Diamond: 138-140], In addition, thirteen of the fourteen wild
ancestral domesticated animals were located in Eurasia, seven in
Southwest Asia [160-163]. Sub-Sahara Africa and Mesoamerica, on the
other hand, did not have a single indigenous mammalian candidate suitable for domestication.
Besides, Diamond's emphasis is on the spread of Fertile Crescent
species "to Europe, Egypt and North Africa, Ethiopia, Central Asia, and
the Indus valley." He explicitly writes that the "temperate areas of China
were isolated from western Eurasian areas with similar climates by the
combination of the Central Asian desert, Tibetan plateau, and
Himalayas" [189]. The barriers between China and western Eurasia
were partly transcended during the second millennium BC when
China's own domesticates moved westward, and west Asian domesticates spread eastward [330].
Moreover, the main reason diffusion tended to occur along eastwest axes was not the temperate climate per se, but that such movement
was between regions sharing the same latitude and thus the same day
length and seasons. This meant plants and animals "were already well
adapted (genetically) to the climates of the regions to which they were
spreading" [185]. Diffusion northward or southward occurred at a slower pace, or not at all, because plants and animals were faced with wider
ecological variations requiring greater genetic changes [183-191]. The
point is not, as Blaut counters, that plants and animals are capable of
adapting to a wide range of environments across latitudes [Blaut, 158],
since this is already part of Diamond's explanation, but that the rate and
the number of species domesticated along these two axes, as he meticPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2002
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ulously shows, were substantially different.
Blaut is more convincing when he tackles Diamond's answer to
why Europe, and not China, rose to become the major industrial force
within Eurasia. In the four pages Diamond devotes to this question at
the end of the book, he basically restates old arguments about how
Europe's "indented coastline" encouraged seafaring, and how China's
relative lack of topographic barriers and long navigable rivers facilitated the formation of despotic states. But why reject out of hand any environmental comparison or contrast between China and Europe as
Eurocentric?
Blaut, a professor of geography, believes that all parts of the world
have the same environmental potential for economic modernization. He
disallows any suggestion that sub-Sahara Africa, for example, may have
encountered multiple and formidable geographical barriers to its economic and cultural development as "unsupported myths from colonial
times" [104]. Yet it was Fernand Braudel, hardly a scholar to be accused
of colonial prejudices, who wrote that, perhaps, "in understanding
Black Africa, geography is more important than history" [1995: 120].
The obstacles were difficult indeed. This central region of Africa is
surrounded by the Sahara desert in the north, the Kalahari Desert in the
south, the Atlantic Ocean on the west, and the Indian Ocean on the east.
As Thomas Sowell further specifies, the shallow coastline of this region
provides few harbors where ships can dock, and few navigable rivers
[Sowell 1998: 99-109], "A serious handicap," writes Braudel, "because
all progress in civilization is made easier by mutual contact and influence" [1995:124], And there were other difficulties: long dry spells followed by torrential rains, limits on the number of days land could be
worked, intrinsically poorer soils, more deadly (tropical) diseases, and
a serious lack of draft animals in farming [Jones 1981, Landes 1998].
Instead of looking for uniformity in the world, we should praise the
talent and perseverance that have enabled humans of different races,
languages, and religions to adapt to so many different environments
[Fernandez-Armesto 2000], China, the world's oldest continuous civilization and the dominant cultural center of East Asia, occupies today
7% of the world's land surface but makes up 25% of the world's population. India has a higher population density, but the amount of arable
land in India is much higher at 57%, whereas the amount in China is
only 11% [Reader 1990: 183)].
Not just today, but throughout history, China has managed to feed
more people per area of land than any region. During Han times
4
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(206BC-220AD), when settlement to the still-to-be-cultivated wet rice
fields of the Lower Yangtzi was in the very early stages, and the inhabitants were concentrated in the central and lower valleys of the Yellow
River, the official census of AD 2 recorded a population of 58 million
[Ebrey 2000: 73]. The population of Europe to the Ural Mountains, by
contrast, was 26 million in AD 600. The Aztecs had an empire of five
million people, which was probably twice the population of Ancient
Egypt.
China's population did not rise above a maximum of 60 to 70 million in the millennium before the Sung period (960-1279), but as wetrice agriculture expanded steadily in the Yangzi Delta during this era,
and new varieties of early ripening rice were introduced, it doubled to
120 million. In the 16th century, despite cycles of decline, it reached
about 150 million, and then 150 to 200 million in 1700, and 430 million
in 1840 [Feuerwerker 1990: 227-228], Why was China able to support
such a high number of people with such a low percentage of arable
land?
An answer to this question, and the whole question of why China
did not industrialize before Europe, will require an integrated examination of many sets of environmental variables. Allow me to close this
review with what I think are the key contrasting variables.
First, China benefited from the easy-to-work, organically-rich
loessland of the north with its exceptional porosity and its ability to
remain fertile, only requiring enough water.
Second, China enjoyed the Yellow River, which is the heaviest carrier of silt in the world, and the development of hydraulic works could
be a blessing to intensive agriculture.
Third, wet rice was a plant which, by contrast with other grains,
could be cultivated on the same land every year indefinitely, and could
produce two or sometimes three harvests every year (Braudel 1981).
Fourth, wet rice fields could yield more than any other grain in a
constant area of land through the intensification of labor use and land
use (or land-saving technologies), without substantial capital (or laborsaving) investments (Bray 1985).
Fifth, China's economy might have been "locked-in" to a laborusing pattern of growth due to the manner in which its hydraulic technology interacted with the environment. Dealing with recurrent tasks
and problems such as flooding, sediment clogging, dyking, and levelling, together with the pressure of population growth and the search for
military and political supremacy, required continuous maintenance and
6
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further expansion of hydraulic systems if the original investment was
not to be lost (Elvin 1993).
Blaut's advice that we drop the unqualified certainty that Europe
had a uniquely favorable environment should be welcomed. We need a
historical balance-sheet of the environmental pluses and minuses of the
western and the eastern extremities of the great plain of Eurasia. The
variety and the contrasts are endless. There is no simple answer, but the
question - Eurocentric or Sinocentric - cannot be avoided.
Endnotes
1. For a critical empirical assessment of Frank's Re-Orient, including
Wong's China Transformed, Historical Change and the Limits of
the European Experience, see Ricardo Duchesne (2001- 2002).
2. A recent anthology of pre-twentieth theories about race is:
Bernasconi and Lott (2000).
3. Goody's The East in the West is also a misleading critique of
Weberian "culturalist" explanations of the rise of the West which
ignores the distinction Weber makes between three types of rationality. In the first chapter of this book. Rationality in Review, he
wrongly employs a general definition of rationality (to be contrasted with irrationality) as the basis from which he then evaluates
three examples of rationality (syllogistic reasoning, double entry
accounting, and mercantile profit-making) which are in fact
instances of different types of rationality: theoretical, formal, and
practical respectively.
4. In his masterful, 800-page study, Africa, A Biography of the
Continent (1999), John Reader writes: "Parasites and disease affecting humans are uniquely prevalent in Africa. The afflictions are
numerous; the means of infection bewildering and various" [241],
5. Although Japan did not practice intensive farming as early as
China, one should keep in mind the following observation by
Braudel: "Japan has a population almost twice that of France in an
area only half as large (300,000 against 550,000 square kilometres);
while its arable land is only 15 % of the total compared with 84 %
in France" [1995, 298].
6. In a highly suggestive but disproportionately neglected section of
Braudel's work, Chapter 2, "Daily Bread" of The Structures of
Everyday Life, Volume 1 of Civilization and Capitalism 15th-18th
Century, Braudel examines how three little grains — wheat, rice,
and maize — "have profoundly organized man's material and somehttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol47/iss47/4
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times his spiritual life, to the point where they have become almost
ineradicable structures. Their history and the 'determinism of civilization' they have exercised over the world's peasantry and human
life in general are the subjects of the present chapter" [107],
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